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Summary 
 
In response to a request from Senators Crapo and Baucus, and Representatives Musgrave 
and Pomeroy, the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) has examined 
several options for reforming U.S. wheat policies.  In addition to a Baseline that 
continues current policies, FAPRI examined three sets of policy options. 
 
1) Adjustments to current program scenarios.  These scenarios adjust target prices 
and direct payment rates, but keep other provisions of current programs in place. 
 
2) Target revenue scenarios.  These scenarios establish county-level revenue targets 
per acre, based on historical prices, yields, and payments under current programs.  
Payments would be made when actual per-acre county revenues fall below the 
targeted level. 
 
3) Flex program scenarios.  Under these scenarios, producers would be eligible for 
full payments under one of the three main payment programs (direct payments, 
countercyclical payments (CCPs), and marketing loan benefits), but only 50% of 
the normal payment under the other two programs.  Target prices, direct 
payments, and loan rates would be adjusted. 
 
FAPRI’s stochastic model is used to examine 500 possible outcomes of the scenarios for 
U.S. agricultural markets.  Selected results include: 
  
• Increasing the wheat direct payment rate from the current $0.52 per eligible 
bushel to $1.00 while holding potential CCPs constant would increase farm 
program spending by slightly over $1 billion per year and net farm income by 
over $700 million per year, but would have only small effects on crop supplies 
and prices. 
 
• Effects of a target revenue program would depend on specific provisions of such 
a program.  For similar levels of average government spending, a target revenue 
program would provide more support when yields are below average than would 
the current mix of programs, but would provide less support when prices are 
below average. 
 
• Effects of the flex program would depend on specific provisions.  Under the two 
scenarios examined, many producers would see reductions in loan program 
benefits and CCPs in exchange for increased direct payments.  Changes in CCPs 
and especially changes in loan program benefits have larger proportional effects 
on crop supplies and prices than do changes in direct payments. 
 
The scenarios would have implications for U.S. compliance with current and future 
domestic support commitments with the World Trade Organization.  Under terms of 
the October 2005 U.S. proposal, for example, changes in CCPs and loan program 
benefits would affect measures of blue and amber box support. 
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Wheat Policy Options: Implications for U.S. Agriculture 
 
FAPRI has estimated the impacts of several farm policy options in response to a request 
from Senators Crapo and Baucus, and Representatives Musgrave and Pomeroy.  The 
December 22, 2005 request letter (see the Appendix for the text of the letter) describes 
three basic options prepared by the National Association of Wheat Growers (NAWG).  
As instructed, FAPRI worked with NAWG staff to identify a range of scenarios under the 
three basic options.  Seven of those scenarios are reported here. 
 
The Scenarios 
 
The seven scenarios are evaluated relative to FAPRI’s January 2006 baseline.  Important 
provisions of the scenarios are summarized in Table 1.  All policy changes are assumed 
to be effective with the 2008/09 marketing year.   
 
The first three scenarios can be characterized as modifications of current programs, and 
correspond to “Option 1” in the request letter: 
 
a) The $1.00 direct, $4.40 target, $2.75 loan scenario.  Increase the direct payment rate 
for wheat from the current $0.52 per eligible bushel to $1.00, and increase the target price 
from the current $3.92 per bushel to $4.40.  Maintain the current wheat loan rate of $2.75 
per bushel and all other current program provisions.   
 
b) The $1.00 direct, $4.40 target, no loan scenario.  Same as the first scenario, except 
eliminates the marketing loan program.  With no loan rate, the countercyclical payment is 
no longer capped at the target price minus the direct payment rate minus the loan rate.  
This could be seen as replacing the marketing loan program with a “program based on 
historic base and yield” as indicated in the request letter.   
 
c) The $0.52 direct, $5.00 target, $2.75 loan scenario.  Same as current law, except the 
target price for wheat increases from the current $3.92 per bushel to $5.00.  This scenario 
was not included in the original request letter, but was suggested by NAWG staff. 
 
The second set of two scenarios corresponds to the “target revenue program” (TRP) 
discussed under “Option 2” in the request letter: 
 
a) The $0.52 direct, county-based scenario.  Eliminate the current countercyclical 
payment (CCP) and marketing loan programs for wheat and replace them with a target 
revenue program (TRP).  The county target revenue per acre is set equal to a moving ten-
year average of state market prices multiplied by the average county yield between 1998 
and 2007, plus 1998-2007 average county payments per eligible acre under the marketing 
loan, production flexibility contract, market loss assistance, direct payment, and CCP 
programs.  The payment rate under the program is the greater of zero or the target 
revenue, minus the state average price times the county average yield, minus the average 
direct payment per eligible acre.  The TRP is then the payment rate multiplied by the base 
acreage, multiplied by 0.85.  It is our belief that this program structure would qualify the 
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TRP for blue-box treatment under the 2004 WTO framework agreement and the October 
2005 U.S. proposal.  For other commodities, 2002 farm bill provisions remain in place. 
 
b) The $1.00 direct, county-based scenario.  Same as the first target revenue scenario, 
except the direct payment rate is increased from $0.52 per eligible bushel to $1.00.   The 
TRP is again assumed to apply only to wheat.   
 
Finally, the last two scenarios correspond to the “flex program” discussed under “Option 
3” in the request letter: 
 
a) The $1.00 direct, $4.40 target, $2.86 loan scenario.  The scenario increases the wheat 
direct payment rate to $1.00 per bushel, the target price to $4.40 per bushel, and the loan 
rate to $2.86 per bushel.  Producers are assumed to be eligible to receive 100% of one 
payment calculated in the 2002 farm bill fashion, but only 50% of the other two 
payments.  Given assumed program parameters, it appears it would almost always be 
preferable for wheat producers to take 100% of the (increased) direct payment and 50% 
of the CCPs and marketing loan benefits for which they would otherwise qualify.  To 
simplify the analysis, the models are run assuming all producers would make this choice.  
Current programs are assumed to continue (with full payments) for all other crops. 
 
b) The budget neutral, all crops scenario.  The flex program is assumed to operate for 
all crops.  For each crop, direct payment rates and target prices are increased by the same 
absolute amount so that commodity-specific government outlays over fiscal years 2009-
2013 are approximately the same as in the baseline.  For wheat, for example, the direct 
payment rate and the target price are each increased by $0.06 per bushel above baseline 
levels, to $0.58 and $3.98 per bushel, respectively.  Loan rates are maintained at baseline 
levels for all crops.  The size of the increase in direct payment rates and target prices for 
each commodity depends on the level of spending on the CCP and loan programs in the 
baseline.  The greater the baseline expenditures, the greater the direct payment rate and 
target price increases, as the resulting increase in direct payments is “paid for” by 
producers receiving only 50% of the loan program benefits and CCPs for which they 
would otherwise qualify.  To simplify the analysis, it assumed that all producers would 
choose to take 100% of their direct payments and 50% of the other two payments.  For 
most commodities under most circumstances, this appears to be a reasonable assumption, 
although there would be exceptions, particularly in years with low expected prices when 
it may be optimal for some producers (especially producers of cotton and peanuts) to take 
50% of their direct payment and 100% of one of the other two payments.   
 
All scenarios assume adjustments in payment limitation rules so that producers are no 
more likely to be affected by limitations than they are under current law. A number of 
other scenarios were also examined, but not reported here.  Under Option 1, these 
included other combinations of direct payments and target prices.  Under Option 2, a 
scenario determining payments using national-level prices and yields rather than local 
prices and yields was examined.  Under Option 3, another scenario examined alternative 
direct payment rates and target prices for crops other than wheat.  These other scenarios 
are excluded from this report primarily because of space concerns.
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Table 1.  Policy assumptions, 2008-2012 crop years
Option 1: Adjustments to current program Option 2: Target revenue Option 3: Flex program
$1.00 direct $1.00 direct $0.52 direct $0.52 direct $1.00 direct $1.00 direct Budget
$4.40 target $4.40 target $5.00 target county- county- $4.40 target neutral
Baseline $2.75 loan No loan $2.75 loan based based $2.86 loan all crops
Direct payment rates (dollars per bushel)
  Wheat 0.52 1.00 1.00 0.52 0.52 1.00 1.00 0.58
  Corn 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.38
  Soybeans 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.83
(cents per pound)
  Upland cotton 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67 16.50
Target prices (dollars per bushel)
  Wheat 3.92 4.40 4.40 5.00 n.a. n.a. 4.40 3.98
  Corn 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.73
  Soybeans 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 6.19
(cents per pound)
  Upland cotton 72.40 72.40 72.40 72.40 72.40 72.40 72.40 82.23
Loan rates (dollars per bushel)
  Wheat 2.75 2.75 n.a. 2.75 n.a. n.a. 2.86 2.75
  Corn 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95
  Soybeans 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
(cents per pound)
  Upland cotton 52.00 52.00 52.00 52.00 52.00 52.00 52.00 52.00
Target revenue program
  Applicability n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Wheat only Wheat only n.a. n.a.
  Target revenue n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Based on Based on n.a. n.a.
historical historical
county county
yields and yields and
payments, payments,
state state
prices* prices*
Flex program
  Applicability n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Wheat only All crops
  % of 1 payment available
      (assumed to be direct) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 100
  % of other 2 payments
      available (assumed to
      be countercyclical & loan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 50 50
* A county's target revenue per eligible acre is defined as the 1998-2007 average county yield multiplied by the most recent 10-year 
average state price, plus 1998-2007 average payments per eligible acre from the direct payment, production flexibility contract, market
loss assistance, countercyclical payment, and marketing loan programs.  The current year revenue per eligible acre is the county average 
yield multiplied by the state average price, plus direct payments per eligible acre.  The payment rate per eligible acre is equal to the
maximum of zero or the target revenue minus the current year revenue.  For each producer, total payments equal the payment rate per
eligible acre multiplied by the producer's base acreage, multiplied by 0.85.
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The Modeling Approach 
 
The baseline for the analysis is the stochastic baseline developed by FAPRI based on 
January 2006 conditions.  The stochastic baseline is a set of 500 outcomes for commodity 
supply, demand, and prices, government costs, farm income, and other indicators, all 
based on the assumption of current policies but making different assumptions about crop 
yields, demand conditions, and a number of other factors.  For each of the seven policy 
scenarios, relevant policy parameters are altered and the FAPRI modeling system is used 
to estimate impacts relative to the baseline. 
 
The FAPRI stochastic model is based on national-level supply, demand, and prices, so 
some additional work was required to estimate impacts of a county-based TRP.  County-
level wheat data for 1995-2005 were used to estimate what TRP payments would be if 
conditions of that period were repeated in the future.  Those results, based on actual 
county-level data, were then used to calibrate the national stochastic model so that it 
would generate reasonable estimates of county-based TRP payments given model values 
for national yields and prices.1  Two points are worth noting: 
 
1) County-level data is not available for all counties and all years.  The National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) does not report county-level data when 
limited numbers of producers or other factors cause disclosure issues; instead 
counties are aggregated to protect confidentiality.  The aggregations change from 
year to year, so in many cases there is no consistent series across time.  Between 
1995 and 2005, 12 percent of wheat production occurred in counties where there 
were not 11 straight years of available county-level data.  Somewhat surprisingly, 
this problem even appeared occasionally in major wheat states such as North 
Dakota.  For purposes of the analysis, the “missing” counties were assumed to 
behave in the same way as the average of all other counties, but this raises 
questions about how such a program would operate in practice.  State level prices 
are used to compute target and actual revenue, as county-level prices are not 
available from NASS. 
2) Payments under the TRP would occur for most counties in years like 1999, when 
prices were low, but only in counties with abnormally low yields in many other 
years.  Given all the assumptions of the analysis, TRP payments would be made 
in 27% of counties on average (70% in a year like 1999; 5% in a year like 2005). 
 
                                                 
1 The national mean payment rate for each year was calculated from the county-level analysis of 1995-2005 
data.  A similar calculation was made of what the payment rate would have been had payment triggers been 
made based on national prices and yields.  A simple equation was estimated, with national payment rate 
based on county data estimated as a function of national revenues per acre.  To validate the equation, the 
resulting estimate of 2008/09 payments using the two approaches were compared, and found to be within a 
few cents per bushel of being identical.  Further details regarding the analytical approach are available upon 
request (contact Patrick Westhoff at westhoffp@missouri.edu).  
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Results 
 
The tables summarize the baseline and impacts of the scenarios.  The analysis assumes 
the policy options are implemented beginning with the 2008/09 crop year, and tables 
provide estimates of average impacts over the 2008/09-2012/13 period (fiscal years 2009-
2013 for government costs; calendar years 2008-2012 for farm income).  Therefore, each 
number in a table is actually the average of 2,500 numbers—500 stochastic outcomes for 
each of five years.  More detailed tables provide annual averages through 2015/16, and if 
desired, it is possible to look at each of the 500 stochastic outcomes. 
 
Tables 2-11 follow the same format.  The first column of numbers in each table 
represents the average of stochastic baseline outcomes for the 2008/09-2012/13 period.  
The remaining columns show the average absolute change from baseline values 
resulting from implementation of each of the policy options.  For example, Table 2 
indicates that average wheat planted area for the 2008-2012 period is estimated to be 
57.28 million acres under a continuation of 2002 farm bill policies (the baseline).  The 
table indicates the $1.00 direct, $4.40 target, $2.75 loan scenario under Option 1 
increases wheat planted area by an average of 70,000 acres—in other words, the 2008-
2012 average wheat planted area is estimated to be 57.35 million acres if direct payments 
are increased to $1.00 per bushel, target prices are increased to $4.40 per bushel, and all 
other provisions of current law are kept at 2002 farm bill levels. 
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Wheat supply and utilization 
 
• The most important thing to note is that none of the policy options have large impacts 
on wheat supply, use, or prices (Table 2). 
 
• All else equal, an increase in direct payments would have a very small positive effect 
on acreage and production of wheat and other crops.  This explains the 70,000 acre 
average increase in wheat area in the $1.00 direct, $4.40 target, $2.75 loan scenario 
under Option 1. 
 
• Eliminating the marketing loan program (as in the $1.00 direct, $4.40 target, no loan 
scenario under Option 1 and both scenarios under Option 2) has two important market 
effects.  First, by reducing payments tied to production, eliminating the marketing 
loan program has a negative impact on wheat production, all else equal.  Second, 
eliminating the marketing loan program results in a modest reduction in carryover 
stocks (commercial stocks increase in response to the elimination of the loan 
program, but do not fully offset the reduction in stocks under the loan program). 
 
• Increasing the wheat target price in the $0.52 direct, $5.00 target, $2.75 loan 
scenario under Option 1 results in an 860,000 acre increase in wheat area planted and 
a 2.4 cent per bushel average reduction in wheat prices.  The estimated impact on 
acreage is greater than it would have been had the same amount of additional 
payments been made under the direct payment program, but substantially less than if 
the same amount of money been provided under the marketing loan program. 
 
• The target revenue scenarios generally have small impacts on commodity supplies 
and prices.  Acreage declines slightly, as eliminating the wheat loan program means 
support is shifted away from a program where payments are only available on actual 
production to a program where payments are not tied to producer supply decisions. 
 
• In the $1.00 direct, $4.40 target, $2.86 loan scenario under Option 3, the impact of 
an increased wheat loan rate is more than offset by the impact of the flex provision 
that is assumed to give producers just 50% of the loan program benefits and CCPs 
they would otherwise be entitled to.  The reduction in per-acre marketing loan and 
CCP benefits has a negative effect on acreage that is almost exactly offset by the 
positive effect of increased direct payments, leaving production essentially 
unchanged. 
 
• Wheat acreage increases in the budget neutral, all crops scenario under Option 3.  
The estimated 300,000 acre increase in wheat area planted results when producers of 
cotton and other crops switch to wheat in response to reduced payments to those 
crops under the marketing loan and CCP programs. 
 
• In general, prices move in the opposite direction of production, but all of the price 
impacts are very small (less than 1%).  Given the tiny changes in market prices, 
estimated impacts on exports and domestic demand are also very small. 
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Table 2.  5-year average impacts of alternative wheat policies on wheat supply and utilization
Option 1: Adjustments to current program Option 2: Target revenue Option 3: Flex program
$1.00 direct $1.00 direct $0.52 direct $0.52 direct $1.00 direct $1.00 direct Budget
Baseline $4.40 target $4.40 target $5.00 target county- county- $4.40 target neutral
level $2.75 loan No loan $2.75 loan based based $2.86 loan all crops
Area (million acres)
   Base area 75.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Planted area 57.28 0.07 -0.12 0.86 -0.06 -0.13 -0.03 0.30
   Harvested area 48.57 0.06 -0.10 0.73 -0.05 -0.11 -0.02 0.26
Yield (bushels per acre)
   Actual 42.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Program, direct 34.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Program, CCP 36.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a. n.a. 0.00 0.00
(million bushels)
Supply 2,689 3 -15 40 -12 -16 -1 13
   Beginning stocks 518 1 -11 9 -10 -11 0 2
   Production 2,086 2 -4 31 -2 -5 -1 11
   Imports 85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Domestic use 1,198 0 -1 7 0 -1 0 2
   Feed, residual 194 0 0 5 0 -1 0 2
   Seed 79 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
   Food, other 924 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exports 983 2 -1 22 0 -2 -1 8
Total use 2,181 2 -2 29 0 -2 -1 10
Ending stocks 508 1 -13 11 -13 -14 0 3
   CCC inventory 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Under loan 52 0 -52 1 -52 -52 3 0
   Other stocks 416 1 39 10 39 39 -3 3
Prices and returns (dollars)
   Farm price/bu. 3.59 -0.003 0.000 -0.024 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.007
   Loan rate/bu. 2.75 0.00 -2.75 0.00 -2.75 -2.75 0.11 0.00
   Average LDP rate/bu. 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.00
   Target price/bu. 3.92 0.48 0.48 1.08 -3.92 -3.92 0.48 0.06
   CCP rate/bu. 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.82 -0.09 -0.09 0.00 0.00
   Direct payment/bu. 0.52 0.48 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.48 0.06
   Gross market revenue/a. 153.77 -0.12 -0.01 -1.04 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.30
   LDP revenue/a. 1.31 0.02 -1.31 0.17 -1.31 -1.31 -0.29 -0.65
   Variable expenses/a. 86.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Mkt+LDP net returns/a. 68.60 -0.10 -1.32 -0.87 -1.36 -1.30 -0.29 -0.94
   CCP revenue/base a. 2.75 0.02 0.07 25.25 -2.75 -2.75 -1.44 -1.35
   TRP revenue/base a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.68 2.69 n.a. n.a.
   Direct payment/base a. 15.25 14.08 14.08 0.00 0.00 14.08 14.08 1.76
Notes:  The table reports averages over the 2008/09-2012/13 marketing years.  Baseline averages are reported in the first column of 
numbers.  The remaining columns report average absolute changes from the baseline resulting from the seven policy scenarios.  
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Area planted  
 
• The policy options all have relatively small impacts on crop acreage (Table 3).   
 
• Even in the baseline, wheat producers receive only limited marketing loan benefits 
and CCPs.  Scenarios that reduce wheat marketing loan benefits and CCPs, therefore, 
only have modest acreage impacts, encouraging a small reduction in wheat acreage 
and a small increase in acreage for other crops. 
 
• The largest impact on wheat acreage is in the $0.52 direct, $5.00 target, $2.75 loan 
scenario under Option 1, due to the very large increase in CCPs.   
 
• Acreage impacts on other crops are largest in the budget neutral, all crops scenario 
under Option 3, as reductions in marketing loan benefits and CCPs result in reduced 
acreage of cotton, rice, peanuts, and other crops dependent on those payments.  
Wheat acreage increases slightly, as wheat is less dependent on loan benefits and 
CCPs. 
 
• Increases in direct payments only have modest positive effects on acreage.  Because 
the payments are not tied to actual production, the FAPRI system assumes that $1.00 
of direct payments has a much smaller impact on acreage than $1.00 in marketing 
loan benefits or market returns.  CCPs are assumed to have an intermediate effect, as 
they are not tied to production, but do provide an insurance effect.  
 
 
Crop prices 
 
• The policy options all have relatively small impacts on crop prices (Table 4). 
 
• In general, crop prices move in the opposite direction from changes in acreage and 
production, although cross-commodity effects are sometimes important. 
 
• Even under the budget neutral, all crops scenario under Option 3, prices for all 
crops change by less than 3 percent from baseline values, with the largest impacts on 
peanuts, cotton, and rice. For feed grains and soybeans, average price impacts are less 
than 1 cent per bushel in all 7 scenarios. 
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Table 3.  5-year average impacts of alternative wheat policies on planted area for major crops
Option 1: Adjustments to current program Option 2: Target revenue Option 3: Flex program
$1.00 direct $1.00 direct $0.52 direct $0.52 direct $1.00 direct $1.00 direct Budget
Baseline $4.40 target $4.40 target $5.00 target county- county- $4.40 target neutral
level $2.75 loan No loan $2.75 loan based based $2.86 loan all crops
Planted area (million acres)
  Corn 84.41 0.01 0.04 -0.08 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.05
  Soybeans 70.95 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.01
  Wheat 57.28 0.07 -0.12 0.86 -0.06 -0.13 -0.03 0.30
  Upland cotton 14.08 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.52
  Sorghum 6.30 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04
  Barley 3.73 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01
  Oats 4.15 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
  Rice 3.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09
  Sunflowers 2.44 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
  Peanuts 1.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02
  Sugar beets 1.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  Sugar cane (harvested) 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 crop planted area 250.32 0.14 0.03 0.71 -0.01 0.01 0.07 -0.32
Hay harvested area 62.54 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.03
12 crops + hay 312.86 0.13 0.02 0.65 -0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.29
Notes:  The table reports averages over the 2008/09-2012/13 marketing years.  Baseline averages are reported in the first column of 
numbers.  The remaining columns report average absolute changes from the baseline resulting from the seven policy scenarios.
Table 4.  5-year average impacts of alternative wheat policies on prices for major crops
Option 1: Adjustments to current program Option 2: Target revenue Option 3: Flex program
$1.00 direct $1.00 direct $0.52 direct $0.52 direct $1.00 direct $1.00 direct Budget
Baseline $4.40 target $4.40 target $5.00 target county- county- $4.40 target neutral
level $2.75 loan No loan $2.75 loan based based $2.86 loan all crops
(dollars per bushel)
Corn 2.40 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001
Soybeans 5.51 -0.003 -0.006 0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 0.007
Wheat 3.59 -0.003 0.000 -0.024 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.007
Sorghum 2.21 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
Barley 2.74 -0.002 -0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0.004
Oats 1.80 -0.002 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(dollars per hundredweight)
Rice 7.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
(cents per pound)
Peanuts 19.15 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.50
Sunflowers 12.30 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02
Upland cotton 51.51 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.82
(dollars per ton)
Hay 102.07 0.03 -0.01 0.24 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.09
Notes:  The table reports averages over the 2008/09-2012/13 marketing years.  Baseline averages are reported in the first column of 
numbers.  The remaining columns report average absolute changes from the baseline resulting from the seven policy scenarios.  
10 
Crop returns—average outcomes 
 
• In the scenarios with an increase in the wheat direct payment rate to $1.00 per eligible 
bushel, returns to producers with wheat base acreage increase by $12-$14 per wheat 
base acre planted to wheat (Table 5).   
 
• Wheat marketing loan benefits are small on average in the baseline (just $1.31 per 
acre), as market prices are generally well above the loan rate.  Reducing or 
eliminating marketing loan benefits, therefore, has only a small effect on average 
producer returns. The loss of marketing loan benefits would have much larger impact 
in years with low prices. 
 
• Similarly, baseline wheat CCPs average just $2.75 per acre.  Therefore, the large 
proportional reduction in CCP revenue under Option 3 has only a small impact on 
producer returns.  Given payment formulas, the market price that triggers CCPs is the 
same $3.40 per bushel in the $1.00 direct, $4.40 target, $2.75 loan scenario under 
Option 1 as in the baseline 
 
• CCPs are sharply increased in the $0.52 direct, $5.00 target, $2.75 loan scenario 
under Option 1, resulting in greater net returns than under any of the other scenarios. 
 
• Given assumptions of the analysis, TRP payments are relatively modest on average.  
Under the $1.00 direct, county-based scenario under Option 2, the average payment 
per base acre is $2.69, almost the same as baseline CCPs.  While average payment 
rates are similar, the two programs would not always make payments under the same 
circumstances.  For example, wheat CCPs would tend to be large in years with above 
average yields and below average prices, while TRP payments would tend to be small 
or zero in such years if offsetting impacts of high yields and low prices leave 
revenues near average.  By construction, TRP payments will only be large when 
county level revenues are below average, whether it is because of low prices, low 
yields, or both. Recall that the TRP is assumed to apply only to wheat under Option 2. 
 
• TRP payments are larger in the $0.52 direct, county-based scenario under Option 2, 
averaging $6.68 per base acre.  Net returns per base acre planted to wheat are less 
than in the $1.00 direct, county-based scenario, as the difference in direct payments 
is much larger than the difference in TRP payments between the two scenarios. 
 
• While the flex program has only modest impacts on the components of wheat 
producer returns (given low baseline marketing loan benefits and CCPs), the impacts 
are much larger on other crops, especially cotton, rice, and peanuts.  For cotton and 
peanuts, there could be situations where rational producers would choose to take 
100% of their CCP or marketing loan benefits and only 50% of their direct payment.   
 
• The changes in producer net returns per base acre are uniformly small under the 
budget neutral, all crops scenario, and would be even smaller if differences between 
base acreage and harvested acreage were taken into account. 
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Table 5.  5-year average impacts of alternative wheat policies on crop returns per acre
Option 1: Adjustments to current program Option 2: Target revenue Option 3: Flex program
$1.00 direct $1.00 direct $0.52 direct $0.52 direct $1.00 direct $1.00 direct Budget
Baseline $4.40 target $4.40 target $5.00 target county- county- $4.40 target neutral
level $2.75 loan No loan $2.75 loan based based $2.86 loan all crops
Wheat (dollars per acre)
  Market gross returns 153.77 -0.12 -0.01 -1.04 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.30
  - Variable costs 86.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  = Market net returns 67.29 -0.12 -0.01 -1.04 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.30
  + Loan program benefits 1.31 0.02 -1.31 0.17 -1.31 -1.31 -0.29 -0.65
  = Market + loan net returns 68.60 -0.10 -1.32 -0.87 -1.36 -1.30 -0.29 -0.94
(dollars per wheat base acre)
  + CCP or TRP 2.75 0.02 0.07 25.25 3.93 -0.06 -1.44 -1.35
  + Direct payment 15.25 14.08 14.08 0.00 0.00 14.08 14.08 1.76
(dollars per wheat base acre planted to wheat)
  = Net returns w/ payments 86.60 14.00 12.82 24.38 2.57 12.72 12.35 -0.53
Corn (dollars per acre)
  Market gross returns 369.25 -0.17 -0.34 0.23 -0.14 -0.34 -0.21 0.21
  - Variable costs 203.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  = Market net returns 166.11 -0.17 -0.34 0.23 -0.14 -0.34 -0.21 0.21
  + Loan program benefits 8.74 0.05 0.14 -0.09 0.08 0.15 0.08 -4.62
  = Market + loan net returns 174.86 -0.12 -0.20 0.14 -0.05 -0.19 -0.13 -4.41
(dollars per corn base acre)
  + Countercyclical payment 10.08 0.04 0.09 -0.07 0.04 0.09 0.05 -5.11
  + Direct payment 24.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.70
(dollars per corn base acre planted to corn)
  = Net returns w/ payments 209.31 -0.08 -0.10 0.07 -0.01 -0.10 -0.08 -0.81
Soybeans (dollars per acre)
  Market gross returns 229.31 -0.13 -0.25 0.15 -0.09 -0.25 -0.16 0.27
  - Variable costs 104.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  = Market net returns 124.35 -0.13 -0.25 0.15 -0.09 -0.25 -0.16 0.27
  + Loan program benefits 12.10 0.05 0.12 -0.08 0.06 0.12 0.07 -6.06
  = Market + loan net returns 136.44 -0.08 -0.13 0.07 -0.03 -0.12 -0.09 -5.78
(dollars per soybean base acre)
  + Countercyclical payment 4.21 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 -2.13
  + Direct payment 11.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.21
(dollars per soybean base acre planted to soybeans)
  = Net returns w/ payments 152.18 -0.07 -0.10 0.05 -0.02 -0.10 -0.07 2.29
Upland cotton (dollars per acre)
  Market gross returns 466.26 -0.06 -0.17 0.33 -0.06 -0.17 -0.10 6.47
  - Variable costs 368.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  = Market net returns 97.64 -0.06 -0.17 0.33 -0.06 -0.17 -0.10 6.47
  + Loan program benefits 46.64 0.04 0.11 -0.24 0.04 0.12 0.07 -25.73
  = Market + loan net returns 144.28 -0.02 -0.05 0.09 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -19.26
(dollars per cotton base acre)
  + Countercyclical payment 61.16 0.02 0.05 -0.09 0.01 0.05 0.03 -31.53
  + Direct payment 34.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.44
(dollars per cotton base acre planted to cotton)
  = Net returns w/ payments 239.67 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.35
Notes:  The table reports averages over the 2008/09-2012/13 marketing years.  Baseline averages are reported in the first column of 
numbers.  The remaining columns report average absolute changes from the baseline resulting from the seven policy scenarios.  
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Crop returns-distribution of outcomes 
 
• The various scenarios affect not just the average level of producer returns, but also 
the distribution of returns depending on actual price, yield, and production cost 
outcomes. 
 
• In the baseline, average 2010/11 wheat producer net returns per wheat base acre 
planted to wheat are actually slightly greater in the 100 stochastic outcomes where the 
price is less than $3.23 per bushel than in the 100 outcomes where the price is 
between $3.23 and $3.52 (Figure 1).  This occurs because low prices are generally 
associated with high yields and because at low prices, producers are eligible for both 
loan program benefits and CCPs.  There is a range of prices (from the loan rate to 
slightly above the loan rate) where a $0.01 per bushel decrease in season-average 
market prices increases CCPs by $0.01 per bushel and increases national average loan 
program benefits as well, resulting in an overall increase in producer revenues. 
 
• The $1.00 direct, $4.40 target, $2.75 loan scenario under Option 1 (labeled Option 
1a in the figures) increases producer returns by approximately $14 per acre under all 
baseline price outcomes. 
 
• The $1.00 direct, county-based scenario under Option 2 (labeled Option 2b in the 
figures) has about the same average impact on producer revenues as the $1.00 direct, 
$4.40 target, $2.75 loan scenario under Option 1, but different outcomes at different 
prices.  In particular, the TRP scenario makes significantly smaller payments on 
average at prices below $3.23 per bushel than in the other scenario, but slightly larger 
payments than in the other scenario at higher prices.  Because the TRP makes 
payments based on revenues rather than prices, it is less likely than current programs 
to make large payments in years when prices are below average because of above-
average yields. 
 
• In contrast, the TRP is more likely to make payments when yields are below average 
than is the case under current programs (Figure 2).  With or without an increase in 
direct payments, net returns to wheat producers are strongly related to wheat yields 
under current programs.  There is still a positive relationship between yields and 
returns with the TRP in place, but returns are greater at low yields under the $1.00 
direct, county-based scenario under Option 2 than at low yields under the $1.00 
direct, $4.40 target, $2.75 loan scenario under Option 1.  The reverse is true at 
higher yield levels. 
 
• Finally, note that none of the options does anything to reduce variability in producer 
net returns caused by variability in production expenses (Figure 3).  Not surprisingly, 
net returns generally decline as production expenses increase.  The pattern is not as 
clear as one might expect, however, in part because of interactions with markets for 
biofuels. Higher fuel prices cause increases in production costs that reduce producer 
net returns, but they also increase the profitability of ethanol production, resulting in 
higher prices for corn and other grains.  On average, the cost effect dominates. 
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  Figure 2. Wheat yields and net returns, 2010/11 
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  Figure 3. Wheat variable production expenses and net returns, 2010/11 
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Payments to crop producers 
 
• The scenarios that increase the wheat direct payment rate from $0.52 per eligible 
bushel to $1.00 per eligible bushel increase wheat direct payments by $1.05 billion 
per year (Table 6). 
 
• In the $1.00 direct, $4.40 target, $2.75 loan scenario under Option 1, CCPs and 
marketing loan benefits are similar to baseline levels.  The very small reported 
differences can be attributed to very small changes in production and market prices, 
as there is no change in the prices that trigger CCPs or marketing loan benefits. 
 
• In the $1.00 direct, $4.40 target, no loan scenario under Option 1, the reduction in 
marketing loan benefits is larger than the increase in CCPs.  This occurs primarily 
because there is no increase in CCPs to offset lost marketing loan payments when 
prices are slightly above the baseline loan rate.  Limited loan program benefits are 
generally available even when national season-average market prices are slightly 
above the loan rate.  CCPs only increase in response to the elimination of the loan 
program when national season-average prices are below the loan rate. 
 
• The $0.52 direct, $5.00 target, $2.75 loan scenario under Option 1 results in a $1.9 
billion increase in annual wheat CCPs and overall payments, the largest increase in 
payments of any scenario reported here. 
  
• The $0.52 direct, county-based scenario under Option 2 results in wheat TRP 
payments that exceed baseline CCPs by about $300 million per year.  Given the 
estimated reduction in marketing loan benefits, overall annual government payments 
increase by $250 million above baseline levels. 
  
• In the $1.00 direct, county-based scenario under Option 2, average annual wheat 
TRP payments are almost identical to baseline CCPs.  The increase in direct 
payments relative to the baseline and the elimination of the loan program result in a 
net increase in payments of approximately $1 billion per year relative to the baseline. 
 
• The $1.00 direct, $4.40 target, $2.86 loan scenario under Option 3 results in net 
reductions in CCPs and marketing loans, given the assumption that producers would 
only be eligible for 50% of the payments normally available under those programs. 
 
• The budget-neutral, all crops scenario under Option 3 has relatively small effects on 
overall payments for each crop, by construction.  A $2.6 billion increase in direct 
payments is offset by a $1.4 billion reduction in CCPs and a $1.3 billion reduction in 
marketing loan benefits.  As noted earlier, these results assume all producers choose 
to take 100% of their increased direct payments and 50% of the CCPs and marketing 
loan benefits they would otherwise receive. 
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Table 6.  5-year average impacts of alternative wheat policies on payments to crop producers
Option 1: Adjustments to current program Option 2: Target revenue Option 3: Flex program
$1.00 direct $1.00 direct $0.52 direct $0.52 direct $1.00 direct $1.00 direct Budget
Baseline $4.40 target $4.40 target $5.00 target county- county- $4.40 target neutral
level $2.75 loan No loan $2.75 loan based based $2.86 loan all crops
(million dollars)
Direct payments 5,259 1,051 1,051 0 0 1,051 1,051 2,632
  Corn 2,109 0 0 0 0 0 0 753
  Sorghum 199 0 0 0 0 0 0 40
  Barley 84 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
  Oats 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
  Wheat 1,139 1,051 1,051 0 0 1,051 1,051 131
  Rice 425 0 0 0 0 0 0 148
  Soybeans 598 0 0 0 0 0 0 530
  Peanuts 67 0 0 0 0 0 0 95
  Sunflowers 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
  Other oilseeds 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
  Upland cotton 614 0 0 0 0 0 0 905
Countercyclical paym'ts 2,710 7 16 1,894 301 7 -101 -1,389
  Corn 875 3 8 -6 4 8 5 -444
  Sorghum 58 0 1 0 0 1 0 -29
  Barley 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 -6
  Oats 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  Wheat (includes TRPs) 207 2 5 1,903 297 -5 -108 -102
  Rice 116 0 0 0 0 0 0 -63
  Soybeans 222 1 1 -1 0 1 1 -113
  Peanuts 122 0 0 0 0 0 0 -67
  Sunflowers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  Other oilseeds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  Upland cotton 1,098 0 1 -2 0 1 1 -566
Marketing loan benefits 2,513 10 -40 -9 -52 -39 0 -1,329
  Corn 672 4 11 -7 7 12 6 -356
  Sorghum 32 0 1 0 0 1 0 -16
  Barley 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 -9
  Oats 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1
  Wheat 65 1 -65 10 -65 -65 -15 -32
  Rice 179 0 0 0 0 0 0 -95
  Soybeans 857 4 9 -6 4 9 6 -428
  Peanuts 57 0 1 0 0 1 0 -33
  Sunflowers 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 -6
  Other oilseeds 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 -9
  Upland cotton 604 1 2 -4 1 2 1 -344
Total payments 10,482 1,069 1,028 1,885 250 1,020 950 -86
  Corn 3,656 7 19 -13 10 20 11 -47
  Sorghum 289 1 1 0 1 1 1 -5
  Barley 112 0 1 0 0 1 0 -1
  Oats 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1
  Wheat 1,411 1,054 992 1,913 232 982 928 -2
  Rice 720 0 0 0 0 0 0 -10
  Soybeans 1,678 5 10 -7 5 11 6 -10
  Peanuts 246 0 1 -1 0 1 1 -5
  Sunflowers 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
  Other oilseeds 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 -5
  Upland cotton 2,316 1 3 -6 1 3 2 -5
Notes:  The table reports averages over the 2008/09-2012/13 marketing years.  Baseline averages are reported in the first column of 
numbers.  The remaining columns report average absolute changes from the baseline resulting from the seven policy scenarios.  
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Net government outlays 
 
• The estimated impacts of the scenarios on average annual government outlays (Table 
7) generally are consistent with the estimates of changes in producer payments.   
 
• The estimated average annual impacts on government outlays between fiscal years 
2009 and 2012 sometimes differ slightly from the estimated impacts on 2008/09-
2012/13 crop year payments for two primary reasons.  First, crop years do not always 
match up well with fiscal years—payments associated with a given crop year can be 
made over two or even three fiscal years.  Second, changes in loan program 
provisions have impacts on government outlays that are not reflected in payment 
estimates. 
 
• By construction, average government outlays under the budget neutral, all crops 
scenario under Option 3 are almost the same as in the baseline.  The savings shown 
under “other net costs” are largely attributed to reductions in interest costs associated 
with lower levels of loan activity.  This type of secondary effect is unlikely to be 
considered if such a policy option were formally scored by the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO). 
 
• It is important to recognize that FAPRI estimates of farm program costs will not 
match those of CBO or other organizations, because of differences in baselines and 
modeling approaches.  Estimated impacts of changes in direct payments are likely to 
be almost identical across organizations, but estimates of payments based on prices 
and/or yields are likely to differ. 
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Table 7.  5-year average impacts of alternative wheat policies on net government outlays
Option 1: Adjustments to current program Option 2: Target revenue Option 3: Flex program
$1.00 direct $1.00 direct $0.52 direct $0.52 direct $1.00 direct $1.00 direct Budget
Baseline $4.40 target $4.40 target $5.00 target county- county- $4.40 target neutral
level $2.75 loan No loan $2.75 loan based based $2.86 loan all crops
Feed grains (million dollars)
  Corn 3,753 7 19 -13 10 20 10 -4
  Sorghum 294 1 1 0 1 1 1 -2
  Barley 111 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
  Oats 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Food grains
  Wheat 1,436 1,054 996 1,910 236 986 934 4
  Rice 728 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oilseeds
  Soybeans 1,689 5 10 -7 5 10 6 4
  Peanuts 312 0 1 -1 0 1 1 0
  Other oilseeds 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1
Other commodities
  Upland cotton 2,442 1 3 -6 1 3 2 -3
  Sugar 38 0 0 -1 0 0 0 6
  Dairy 39 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0
CCC conservation 2,340 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other
  Disaster payments, NAP 325 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  Other net costs 2,175 0 -12 -1 -12 -12 1 -84
Net CCC outlays 15,739 1,069 1,021 1,879 242 1,012 957 -82
Notes:  The table reports averages over the 2009-2013 fiscal years.  Baseline averages are reported in the first column of 
numbers.  The remaining columns report average absolute changes from the baseline resulting from the seven policy scenarios.
Changes affecting crop year 2008/09 would also have impacts on outlays during fiscal year 2008 that are not reflected in this table.  
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Farm receipts 
 
• Given only modest impacts on commodity production and prices, it should not be 
surprising that none of the scenarios has a very large impact on crop and livestock 
cash receipts (Table 8).  In all cases, the average impact on total cash receipts from 
marketings is less than $100 million, compared to baseline receipts of $244 billion. 
 
• The single largest impact is a negative effect on cotton receipts in the budget 
neutral, all crops scenario under Option 3.  The reduction in cotton production under 
that scenario is proportionally larger than the increase in cotton prices, so receipts 
decline. 
 
 
Farm production expenses 
 
• With little change in crop or livestock production, most categories of production costs 
show little change from baseline values under all seven scenarios (Table 9). 
 
• The largest exception to this rule is rent paid to nonoperator landlords. In the model, 
increases in producer net returns (whether caused by increased production, prices, or 
payments or reduced production costs) result in an increase in rental payments, as 
landlords are assumed to adjust rental rates over time.   
 
• Production costs decline slightly from baseline levels in the budget neutral, all crop 
scenario under Option 3.  The reduction in loan program benefits reduces production 
of input-intensive cotton, rice, and peanuts. 
 
19 
Table 8.  5-year average impacts of alternative wheat policies on farm cash receipts
Option 1: Adjustments to current program Option 2: Target revenue Option 3: Flex program
$1.00 direct $1.00 direct $0.52 direct $0.52 direct $1.00 direct $1.00 direct Budget
Baseline $4.40 target $4.40 target $5.00 target county- county- $4.40 target neutral
level $2.75 loan No loan $2.75 loan based based $2.86 loan all crops
(million dollars)
Feed grains 32,013 -5 -11 4 -6 -11 -6 7
Food grains 8,805 3 -23 49 -19 -24 -1 1
Oilseeds 16,829 -5 -9 3 -4 -9 -5 26
Cotton 6,025 1 2 -5 1 2 1 -104
Sugar 2,264 0 -1 4 0 -1 -1 -12
Other crops 57,622 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cattle 45,283 0 -1 -5 0 -1 0 4
Hogs 13,889 -1 -2 1 -1 -2 -1 4
Dairy products 25,804 0 -1 4 -1 -1 0 0
Poultry, eggs 29,819 -3 -6 1 -3 -6 -3 7
Other livestock 5,661 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total cash receipts 244,014 -11 -52 55 -33 -54 -18 -68
Notes:  The table reports averages over the 2008-2012 calendar years.  Baseline averages are reported in the first column of 
numbers.  The remaining columns report average absolute changes from the baseline resulting from the seven policy scenarios.
Table 9.  5-year average impacts of alternative wheat policies on farm production expenses
Option 1: Adjustments to current program Option 2: Target revenue Option 3: Flex program
$1.00 direct $1.00 direct $0.52 direct $0.52 direct $1.00 direct $1.00 direct Budget
Baseline $4.40 target $4.40 target $5.00 target county- county- $4.40 target neutral
level $2.75 loan No loan $2.75 loan based based $2.86 loan all crops
(million dollars)
Feed 32,986 -6 -18 25 -8 -18 -10 22
Purchased livestock 15,176 1 2 -4 1 2 1 -1
Seed 11,387 2 3 1 1 3 2 -32
Fertilizer and chemicals 22,169 6 4 19 1 3 4 -58
Fuels and electricity 15,070 3 2 10 1 2 2 -25
Interest 18,965 18 17 25 1 16 16 10
Contract and hired labor 27,748 1 1 1 0 1 1 -12
Capital consumption 25,319 33 30 44 3 29 30 21
Rent to non-operators 10,864 294 272 450 41 264 262 107
All other 60,108 17 14 32 2 13 14 -87
Total production expenses 239,793 368 327 604 42 314 322 -57
Notes:  The table reports averages over the 2008-2012 calendar years.  Baseline averages are reported in the first column of 
numbers.  The remaining columns report average absolute changes from the baseline resulting from the seven policy scenarios.  
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Farm income 
 
• Under all of the scenarios, government payments increase and net farm income also 
increases (Table 10). 
 
• In all cases, the increase in net farm income is less than the increase in payments, 
primarily because landlords are assumed to capture part of the benefits by increasing 
rental rates. 
 
• Net farm income increases slightly in the budget neutral, all crops scenario under 
Option 3.  Government payments increase relative to the baseline on a calendar year 
basis, even though crop year payments are near baseline levels. This can be explained 
by timing issues—increased direct payments are made, on average, earlier in the 
marketing year than are CCPs and loan program benefits.  Because the scenario 
increases direct payments at the same time it reduces other payments, the net effect is 
to accelerate payments by a few months, increasing the amount of payments falling 
within the 5-calendar-year window. 
 
Land values 
 
• The increase in producer income under each of the scenarios translates into a modest 
increase in farm real estate values (Table 11).  While farm real estate values are 
affected by many factors, producer returns are at least one relevant factor. 
 
• The increases in farm income and real estate values also have several spillover 
effects.  Producers buy more machinery, which increases capital consumption over 
time.  Higher land values and more machinery purchases translate into increased 
interest expenditures over time as well.
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Table 10.  5-year average impacts of alternative wheat policies on farm income
Option 1: Adjustments to current program Option 2: Target revenue Option 3: Flex program
$1.00 direct $1.00 direct $0.52 direct $0.52 direct $1.00 direct $1.00 direct Budget
Baseline $4.40 target $4.40 target $5.00 target county- county- $4.40 target neutral
level $2.75 loan No loan $2.75 loan based based $2.86 loan all crops
(million dollars)
1. Farm receipts 263,321 -11 -52 56 -33 -54 -18 -68
    Crops 123,558 -7 -42 55 -28 -43 -12 -82
    Livestock 120,456 -4 -10 1 -5 -10 -6 14
    Farm-related 19,307 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
2. Government payments 15,444 1,067 1,027 1,677 207 1,011 957 181
3. Gross cash income 278,765 1,057 975 1,733 175 957 939 114
    (1 + 2)
4. Nonmoney income 15,998 32 30 43 3 28 29 20
5. Value of inventory
    Change 221 2 14 3 12 14 2 -30
6. Gross farm income 294,984 1,092 1,018 1,779 189 999 969 103
    (3 + 4 + 5)
7. Cash expenses 212,874 335 296 560 39 285 292 -78
8. Total expenses 239,793 368 327 604 42 314 322 -57
9. Net cash income 65,891 722 678 1,173 135 672 646 192
    (3 - 7)
10. Net farm income 55,191 723 691 1,175 148 685 647 160
     (6 - 8) 
Notes:  The table reports averages over the 2008-2012 calendar years.  Baseline averages are reported in the first column of 
numbers.  The remaining columns report average absolute changes from the baseline resulting from the seven policy scenarios.
Table 11.  5-year average impacts of alternative wheat policies on average farm real estate values
Option 1: Adjustments to current program Option 2: Target revenue Option 3: Flex program
$1.00 direct $1.00 direct $0.52 direct $0.52 direct $1.00 direct $1.00 direct Budget
Baseline $4.40 target $4.40 target $5.00 target county- county- $4.40 target neutral
level $2.75 loan No loan $2.75 loan based based $2.86 loan all crops
(dollars per acre)
National average 1,742 14.01 12.88 20.24 1.63 12.45 12.52 6.68
Notes:  The table reports averages over 2009-2013 based on January 1 figures.  Baseline averages are reported in the first column of 
numbers.  The remaining columns report average absolute changes from the baseline resulting from the seven policy scenarios.  
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WTO Domestic Support Measures 
 
• Under baseline policies and provisions of the Doha Round proposal made by the 
United States in October 2005, the U.S. total current Aggregate Measure of Support 
(AMS) would average $8.6 billion in 2012 (Table 12).  Under the U.S. proposal, the 
United States would commit to reducing its AMS to $7.6 billion. 
 
• The scenarios affecting only wheat policies have minimal impacts on the U.S. AMS, 
as wheat marketing loan benefits are small on average. 
 
• The budget neutral, all crops scenario under Option 3 would reduce the U.S. AMS 
by slightly more than $1 billion on average.  While the United States would exceed its 
AMS commitment in 53% of the stochastic outcomes for 2012 under baseline 
policies, it would exceed the limit in only 30% of the stochastic outcomes for 2012 
under the flex scenario for all crops because of the reduction in marketing loan 
benefits. 
 
• Under baseline policies, CCP expenditures would average $2.2 billion in 2012, 
significantly less than the U.S.-proposed limit on CCP expenditures of $4.8 billion.  
However, in 11% of the stochastic baseline outcomes for 2012, CCPs would exceed 
the proposed limitation.  
 
• The scenarios that increase direct payment rates and target prices by the same 
absolute amount have little net impact on CCPs, and therefore have little impact on 
the proportion of outcomes exceeding proposed limitations. 
 
• The $0.52 direct, $5.00 target, $2.75 loan scenario under Option 1 would sharply 
increase wheat CCPs, raising total CCPs and blue box support in 2012 to $4.0 billion.  
While this average result is still less than the U.S.-proposed limit on blue box 
spending, in 29% of the stochastic outcomes for 2012, the limit would be exceeded. 
 
• The budget neutral, all crops scenario under Option 3 would reduce average CCP 
expenditures by half.  In no stochastic outcome for 2012 does U.S. blue box spending 
exceed the U.S.-proposed limit.  This result is sensitive to the assumption that all 
producers for all crops would choose to take 50% of their normal CCP in order to 
collect 100% of an increased direct payment. 
 
• All of these domestic support estimates are contingent on the provisions of the U.S. 
proposal.  Other proposals would suggest different accounting rules and different 
support limits. 
 
• Note that all figures in Table 12 are expressed in terms of levels to facilitate 
comparisons with proposed limits.  Tables 2-11 reported scenario impacts in terms of 
absolute changes from baseline values.
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Table 12.  Domestic support estimates for 2012, under provisions of the U.S. October proposal*
Option 1: Adjustments to current program Option 2: Target revenue Option 3: Flex program
$1.00 direct $1.00 direct $0.52 direct $0.52 direct $1.00 direct $1.00 direct Budget
$4.40 target $4.40 target $5.00 target county- county- $4.40 target neutral
Baseline $2.75 loan No loan $2.75 loan based based $2.86 loan all crops
Product-specific (million dollars)
current AMS 8,498 8,508 8,489 8,485 8,476 8,489 8,503 7,419
  Barley 11 11 12 11 11 12 11 5
  Corn 389 392 396 383 391 396 393 161
  Cotton (upland) 575 575 576 573 575 576 576 253
  Dairy 5,149 5,149 5,149 5,148 5,149 5,149 5,149 5,149
  Minor oilseeds 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 13
  Oats 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
  Peanuts 63 63 63 62 63 63 63 29
  Rice 135 135 136 135 135 136 135 69
  Sorghum 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 8
  Soybeans 742 746 748 735 743 748 747 358
  Sugar 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,258 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,263
  Wheat 26 26 0 30 0 0 19 11
  All other 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Nonproduct-specific 
calculated AMS 3,293 3,295 3,295 3,300 3,294 3,295 3,295 3,290
  Crop insurance 2,875 2,877 2,877 2,882 2,876 2,877 2,877 2,872
  All other 418 418 418 418 418 418 418 418
Value of ag. production 241,901 241,886 241,869 241,946 241,897 241,870 241,880 241,782
(average de minimis trigger) 6,048 6,047 6,047 6,049 6,047 6,047 6,047 6,045
Nonproduct-specific 
included in current AMS 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87
Total current AMS 8,585 8,594 8,575 8,572 8,563 8,576 8,589 7,506
(WTO commitment) 7,641 7,641 7,641 7,641 7,641 7,641 7,641 7,641
Blue box support 2,231 2,237 2,239 3,963 2,589 2,306 2,169 1,094
(WTO commitment) 4,773 4,773 4,773 4,773 4,773 4,773 4,773 4,773
Proportion of outcomes where:
Total current AMS exceeds
AMS commitment 52.6% 52.6% 52.6% 52.0% 52.6% 52.6% 52.6% 29.6%
CCPs/TRPs exceed 
blue box commitment 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 29.4% 13.2% 10.6% 9.0% 0.0%
* Assumes direct payments are not included in amber or blue box, and that countercyclical payments and target revenue payments are 
classified as blue box.  The current AMS commitment is reduced by 60% between 2007 and 2012.  The blue box commitment is set at 
2.5% of the 1999-2001 average value of production.  The de minimis criteria for product-specific and nonproduct-specific support are set 
at 2.5% of the current value of production.  
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